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# Methodological Issues in Studying the Effectiveness of Nongovernmental and Nonprofit Organizations

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*Many theoretical and methodological difficulties have limited the development of research on the effectiveness of nonprofit organizations. After reviewing contemporary approaches to the task of defining and distinguishing among voluntary, nonprofit organizations, this article suggests several workable indicators that can advance research into effectiveness, especially if they are used in combination. It also presents and illustrates the uses of Boolean algebra as an analytical technique that promises to enhance comparative case study research.*

The concept of organizational effectiveness has long troubled theorists and researchers. In spite of occasional calls for discarding the concept, many researchers and theorists continue to believe that there are differences among organizations that are (or can be) captured by the effectiveness concept (Campbell, 1977; Cameron, 1981; Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983). If effectiveness has been troublesome in general organization theory where the referent is often the business corporation with its bottom line, the effectiveness construct is even more challenging in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and nonprofit organizations (NPOs), for which bottom line financial figures are more ambiguous.

This article is based on the assumption that effectiveness is a useful construct in the study of NGOs and NPOs. Not all theoretical perspectives on organizations treat effectiveness as an important or even real construct. Thus, this paper adopts the view that methodological issues and the methodological choices that researchers make reflect theoretical and paradigmatic or metatheoretical choices. The traditions of organization theory on which this paper most strongly draws are the structural contingency or

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organization-and-environment and resource-dependence theories. Although the two theoretical traditions differ in the extent to which they emphasize the constraints imposed by the external environment on internal processes, they both understand effectiveness as determined by the relations between the organization and its environment (Pfeffer, 1982). This article has two goals: to review and assess some important methodological issues in the study of the effectiveness of NGOs and NPOs and to suggest some alternate responses to certain troublesome issues.

## Defining NGOs and NPOs

Before we can study phenomena, we have to be able to define them and distinguish them from other closely related phenomena. In the United States, two differing bases for the definition of NGOs and NPOs have developed. One way of defining the organizations in which we are interested derives from sociology and political science. In these social sciences, the organizations that we study have long been known as *voluntary organizations* and *voluntary associations*. These labels are not just different words but indicate a different meaning. These labels define the organizations in question and distinguish them from other formal organizations on the basis of why people participate and who benefits. As a beginning point, as Van Til (1988) suggests, participation in such organizations is not biologically compelled, politically coerced, or financially remunerated. Several schemes for the classification of organizations, including those developed by Clark and Wilson (1961), Etzioni (1961), and Blau and Scott (1962), use the basis-of-participation approach. If some voluntary organizations have long been understood as those in which people participate for reasons other than that they must, some have also been understood as benefiting others than owners, employees, or paying customers. Blau and Scott's (1962) classification of organizations on the basis of who benefits does not attempt to locate voluntary organizations in any particular class or classes, although the mutual benefit, service, and commonwealth categories are sometimes seen as including voluntary organizations. Since the prime beneficiary of commonwealth organizations is the public at large and the prime beneficiary of service organizations is clients (especially to the extent that charges are below cost), then these types meet the other-benefiting meaning of voluntary organization. In what sense are mutual benefit organizations voluntary if the prime beneficiaries are members?

As Olson (1965) first defined the problem, certain goods or benefits have a collective or public character such that if one member of a class receives the benefit so must others, but it is uneconomic (in most cases) for some individuals to contribute to produce the good since others could enjoy it without having contributed (the free-rider problem). Thus, existing mutual benefit organizations must either rely on some form of coercion or on selective benefits, or some must voluntarily contribute so that all may

benefit. A long line of research on collective action has raised questions about Olson's initial formulation (Knoke, 1988).

Although the types of incentives and benefits that members seek through mutual benefit associations may be more complex than Olson (1965) proposed, whether (and on what basis) mutual benefit associations can be included as voluntary organizations continues to be a troublesome theoretical and methodological question. One reason for including such organizations with voluntary organizations is that they often benefit others who are not dues-paying members or provide other externalities. Another reason, which derives from the second basis for defining our objects of study, is that mutual benefit associations, at least in the United States, are tax-exempt, as are other-benefiting voluntary organizations. Indeed, some mutual benefit associations are classified as 501(c)(3) tax-deductible, charitable organizations, the tax code home of other-benefiting organizations.

In the United States, the alternative, tax code, approach to the definition of nonprofit organizations has been especially prominent in the literature of economics and legal studies (Hansmann, 1987). Especially for legal scholars, nonprofit organizations are distinguished from others by virtue of their exemption from corporate income taxes, a subset of which—the 501(c)(3) organizations—is also eligible for tax-deductible gifts. The 501(c)(3) organizations are sometimes called the *charitables* (Simon, 1987), and organizations so classed must meet certain organizational and operational tests (Hopkins, 1987), including what Hansmann (1980) has called the *nondistribution constraint*—the prohibition against the distribution of residual earnings to those who control the organization. This nondistribution constraint is the basis for the economist's distinction between these organizations and businesses. If we rely on the tax code definition, we may find ourselves studying organizations that are very different in terms of why people participate and who benefits, even if they share a common legal status.

Of course, these two approaches to the definition of *voluntary* and *nonprofit* organization do not lead to the identification of completely distinct sets of organizations. However, the two approaches are not likely to identify exactly the same sets of organizations. The nonprofit organizations approach has often studied hospitals, day care providers, and educational organizations. The voluntary organizations tradition has often studied neighborhood and community organizations and volunteers in human services organizations. Further, the two approaches emphasize very different characteristics, and the topics and issues studied differ as a result. Studies of voluntary organizations have asked who volunteers and why, and they have focused on the relation between voluntary organizations and community social structure and political processes. Studies of nonprofit organizations have sought to explain the existence of such firms in market economies and to model their economic behavior. The choice between these approaches is clearly based on theoretical preferences and discipli-

nary background. As the field advances, these differing approaches are becoming less distinct, although they have not yet disappeared.

### **Distinguishing Among Types of NGOs and NPOs**

Researchers drawing on either tradition have developed differing kinds of classifications of such organizations. Within the voluntary organizations tradition, Gordon and Babchuk's (1966) distinctions among expressive, instrumental, and instrumental-expressive organizations are well-known. Hansmann's (1980) classification of nonprofit organizations as mutual-donative, entrepreneurial-donative, mutual-commercial, and entrepreneurial-commercial is also widely known, although the distinction between commercial and donative seems to be much more widely used than the full classification (Hopkins, 1989). Hansmann (1989) recently argued that the distinction between donative and commercial is becoming increasingly important. He suggests that public policy may begin to treat the commercial nonprofit organizations as if they were businesses, since they seem to behave like businesses.

However, most classifications attempt to distinguish among voluntary or nonprofit organizations on the basis of purpose. Smith, Baldwin, and White (1980) offer eighteen different classes. In the United States, the National Center for Charitable Statistics (1987) proposed a national taxonomy of exempt entities that focuses on 501(c)(3) organizations. The taxonomy proposes classification by three criteria: major group (that is, purpose or field of service), major activity, and intended beneficiary. Van Til (1988) suggested classification that more clearly reflects the difference between other-serving and mutual or collective benefit associations, distinguishing between public-regarding or charitable organizations and membership benefit associations.

All, in different ways, draw on both the voluntary and the nonprofit perspectives to make distinctions. The scheme of Smith, Baldwin, and White (1980) ranges over the entire set of IRS tax-exempt categories, encompassing mutual benefit associations (including labor unions), political parties, and consumer cooperatives as well as going beyond it to include collective action by groups without legally recognized organizations. This classification draws heavily on the voluntary organizations perspective. The National Center for Charitable Statistics (1987) taxonomy draws more heavily on the tax code perspective, with apparently all but 501(c)(3) organizations relegated to category Y—"Reserved for Special Information Needs of Regulatory Bodies-Mutual/Membership Benefit (Specific) & Other." The Van Til (1988) classification, while more nearly combining the two perspectives, does not explicitly place social movement organizations that benefit nonmembers as well as members. That none of the schemes completely integrates the types of organizations identified by the two perspectives is not surprising. It is an impossible task given that one perspec-

tive derives from social theory (of a sort) and the other from the outcomes of practical politics.

Such classification schemes, which focus exclusively on organizations as independent social beings distinct from the human beings who enact them, sometimes lead to an inappropriate frame of reference in research on effectiveness. Nonprofit organizations are sometimes the creatures or instruments of larger collectivities. For instance, some social service providers are de facto government agencies, and some neighborhood organizations are less independent entities than they are instruments of the neighborhood's residents. Thus, asking, "Effective at what, for whom?" may help researchers to stop considering all nonprofit organizations as real, independent actors.

### **Implications of Definitional Perspectives for Research on the Effectiveness of NGOs and NPOs**

This review of definitional perspectives may strike the reader as having more to do with theory (of a rudimentary sort) than it does with methodology. The review helps me to define more clearly the organizations that are most centrally voluntary or charitable—those that materially benefit people (or sometimes other living things) who are not officers, employees, or members. Such organizations are found in many fields of service, but they provide at least some clients with services at no or below cost. This is not to imply that charitable service organizations must or usually benefit the poor (however the *poor* are defined). These are the charitable service NGOs and NPOs. In the United States, these organizations will be 501(c)(3) public charities, although not all 501(c)(3) public charities are necessarily charitable service organizations. Such organizations vary in their use of volunteers, extent and recipients of charitable expenditures, and sources of charitable revenues.

Some voluntary or NGOs and NPOs benefit others not directly but by helping to change social structures or public policies. Social movement and policy advocacy organizations have different kinds of tax code status in the United States, depending in part on the amount of lobbying they do. The crucial identifying characteristic of these organizations is their interest in affecting social structures, public policy, or both. In the United States, the social movement organizations include those associated with the anti-abortion or right-to-life movement, the women's movement, and various peace groups. Policy advocacy organizations include various environmental groups, the N.A.A.C.P., the Children's Defense Fund, and the American Association of Retired Persons. Jenkins (1987) provides a useful review of the literature related to nonprofit organizations and policy advocacy. These other-benefiting social movement and advocacy organizations are a species of mutual benefit or collective action organization, and thus they may also offer services (selective benefits) to dues-paying members and deliver collective benefits to members. They differ from other mutual benefit organizations in having intended beneficiaries beyond their members.

In considering charitable services and social movement and advocacy organizations as central types of NGOs and NPOs, I am not intending to rule out member benefit, including self-help, organizations from this category. However, as the extent to which benefits are limited to members increases, the organizations are less voluntary or charitable, and the exchange relations necessary for their survival are more akin to commercial transactions than they are to philanthropic exchange (Ostrander and Schervish, 1990).

### **Conceiving NGO and NPO Effectiveness**

Because effectiveness is such as a contested concept, I accept that a definitive conception is unlikely—perhaps impossible. Workable approaches are necessary if we are to go beyond speculation and conventional wisdom. For charitable service NGOs and NPOs, at least four different kinds of workable effectiveness measures are likely. Financial indicators may have considerable usefulness, although I do not accept that financial viability is an adequate measure of the effectiveness of NGOs and NPOs, as Price and Mueller (1986) propose. Certainly, some NPOs (for example, hospitals) use and report profitability ratios, but for most NPOs such figures are neither customary nor unambiguous. Rather than measures of profitability or revenues per client, I propose that we use other financial figures, specifically unit cost data, in combination with other nonfinancial measures. Glisson and Martin (1980) is an effectiveness study that uses unit cost measures.

As many will observe, relatively low unit costs can indicate low-quality, ineffective service. Unit cost data combined with client satisfaction data may be much more useful. While some NGOs and NPOs use client satisfaction instruments, comparative research will require the use of a standardized measure. It may be possible to develop a measure that can be used across fields of service, much in the manner of the Quinn and Staines (1979) job satisfaction scale. If for a set of NPOs we were to observe that unit costs and client satisfaction had a strong positive correlation (as unit costs increased, so did client satisfaction), we would confirm that any attempt to balance efficiency with at least one dimension of effectiveness always entailed a trade-off. However, if unit costs and client satisfaction showed a positive correlation only in the lower end of the unit cost range, then we would have found an important threshold.

Constituent satisfaction indicators include measures from clients and others who benefit or support the NGO or NPO. For some organizations, constituents may include parents and friends of clients, donors, and other publics (for example, coreligionists and religious officials for some sectarian organizations). In efforts to develop and use constituent satisfaction measures, a number of methodological decisions will need to be made. For example, constituent populations must be specified by characteristics and in

space and time, and appropriate sampling frames must then be found or created. Appropriate sampling ratios for differing constituencies must also be determined. It is unlikely that all groups should be sampled in the same proportion, and this disproportionate sampling may affect the decisions we make about the weighting of responses so as to achieve an overall satisfaction score. Realistically, all constituencies are not equally important. How can we assess and use that fact? Questionnaires completed by constituency members can include the sort of items developed by Tannenbaum (1956, 1961) and by Tannenbaum and Cooke (1979) to measure perceived influence, modified to reflect the perceived importance of a constituency to the continued operation of the organization. The group averages and the distances between them could then be used to develop weights for each group.

Multiplying the average satisfaction scores of each group by its weighted importance and computing an overall weighted average would provide a single score of constituent satisfaction. As far as I know, this procedure, or something similar, has not been used, and it presents many psychometric challenges, but it has potential for enhancing comparative research both across fields of service and across nations.

Outcome indicators are the third kind of workable effectiveness measures. Outcomes measures have been very common (and often controversial) in some service fields. In the United States, educational institutions have long been assessed on student achievement scores, especially at the elementary and secondary levels, although student outcomes are now becoming more common at the college level as well. Similarly, information about patient outcomes, including mortality rates, is now becoming more widely available in the health care field. Holland and others (1981) show how treatment outcomes can be used in the study of effectiveness. As critics of outcome indicators have observed, it is impossible in most cases to determine whether two organizations that differ on some client outcome differ in effectiveness or whether they differ only in selection (or assignment) of clients. Given this limitation, researchers may want to use outcome indicators when they are available but compare them with other dimensions of effectiveness, such as unit cost and constituent satisfaction.

The fourth workable indicator is reputational measures. In this approach, those in positions that are likely to give them information about many similar organizations are asked to select organizations that they regard as highly or especially effective or to rate the effectiveness of the organizations on a list. If two or more experts pick the same organization independently, a researcher can consider that, whatever its scores on other indicators, it has achieved a reputation for effectiveness. As with the other indicators, reputation is likely to become more interpretable when it is combined with other indicators. Baldwin's (1978) study of hospitals includes a reputational measure as well as other indicators of effectiveness.

Throughout this discussion, I have emphasized the desirability of mul-

tiple indicators. Any one indicator is too limited to capture the multidimensional nature of effectiveness. A multiple indicator approach can also help to clarify the validity of the effectiveness construct. If two or more indicators often covary in regular patterns, the idea that effectiveness is a meaningful construct gains credence. If effectiveness indicators do not consistently covary in any regular patterns, the implication is that the measures are not indicators but distinct variables and that it is not meaningful to invoke effectiveness as a general construct.

One other measure of effectiveness is survival, a much less ambiguous measure than the others. The problem with a survival measure is that it requires us either to collect retrospective data from former participants in defunct organizations or to collect data from participants in current organizations and analyze the data only after some number of the organizations have died. In the first case, it may be difficult to locate participants, and their responses about the organization when it was in operation must be inevitably be biased by their awareness of its death. In the second case, the more time between the data collection and the organization's demise, the less clearly are the two related. The more a researcher can rely on regularly collected organizational data, such as financial and outcomes data, the more useful the second strategy is likely to be. Milofsky and Romo (1988) study the survival of neighborhood-based organizations.

For social movement and advocacy NGOs and NPOs, the workable indicators of effectiveness are constituent satisfaction, reputation, and documentary coding. The first two are or can be carried out as they already are in studies of charitable service organizations. The third is illustrated by Gamson's (1975) study of challenging groups. Gamson (1975) took a random sample of fifty-three social movement and advocacy organizations that existed in the United States between 1800 and 1945. The dependent variables in the study were acceptance—a change in the relationship between the challenging group and its antagonist “from hostility or indifference to a more positive relationship” (Gamson, 1975, p. 31)—and new advantages—whether “potential beneficiaries of the challenging group receive[d] what the group sought for them” (Gamson, 1975, p. 34). Coders assessed these outcomes via a questionnaire to which they responded by reading relevant histories or primary sources. A very high level of intercoder reliability was achieved. The same documentary approach could be used with contemporary groups, although there would be less time available for effects to occur.

## **A New Technique for Comparative Analysis**

The distinction between qualitative, case-oriented and quantitative, variable-oriented data analysis is long-standing and apparently immutable. It is not my intention to review the arguments for and against each type or to



specify when each type is most appropriate. Rather, I want to draw attention to and illustrate the use of a technique that has recently begun to find use in the social sciences. This technique, Boolean algebra, provides a way of combining the power of multivariate analysis with the sensitivity to context of case studies. It can be used both to analyze primary data and to undertake integrative, secondary data analyses. Even if it does not transcend the qualitative-quantitative split, it does combine some of the most useful features of both. Ragin's (1987) recent exposition presents an excellent statement about the uses of the technique.

To illustrate, consider part of Kramer's (1981) comparative study of the sociopolitical roles of voluntary social service organizations in four countries: Israel, the Netherlands, Great Britain, and the United States. As in all good comparative research, Kramer (1981) treats each case in its complexity, detailing the social and political factors that are related to the roles that voluntary social service organizations perform. Kramer (1981) identifies four sociopolitical roles for voluntary social service agencies: vanguard, advocate, value guardian, and service provider. While voluntary agencies currently carry out all four roles in different ways in all four countries, the information presented leads me to conclude that historically, as the modern welfare state was developing in each country, the vanguard role was performed by voluntary organizations in every country but the Netherlands. What social or political conditions, or what combination of conditions, accounts for that pattern of outcomes? Kramer (1981) suggests that the importance of citizen participation in the civic culture on the one hand and the strength of the central government on the other are related to performance of the roles. Before Israel became a nation, participation was strongly valued and widespread, and there was no strong central government. (Both conditions changed substantially after establishment of the state.) The pattern in the United States was the same, while the British case saw strong citizen participation and central government. In the Netherlands, citizen participation was weak, and the central government was strong.

The combinatorial logic of Boolean algebra provides procedures that help us to understand the combination (or combinations) of conditions in which the historic outcome occurs. The first step is to construct what is called a *truth table* (Table 1). Truth tables have as many rows as there are logically possible combinations of dichotomously valued causal variables. Boolean algebra requires that both the causal and outcome variables be represented as 0, 1 variables, where 0 indicates false or absent and 1 true or present. For the causal variables in the analysis of the historic vanguard role, the table will contain  $2^2$  (two variables to the power of the number of causal variables) rows—that is, four. Row 1 is the logically possible case in which strong citizen participation and strong central government are absent. None of the four countries in Kramer's (1981) study fits this case, and thus there is no outcome value for the vanguard role. Row 2 includes

Table 1. Truth Table for Two Causes of Historic Vanguard Role

Row	Condition		Outcome	Number of Cases
	Strong Citizen Participation	Strong Central Government	Historic Vanguard	
	A	B	V	
1	0	0	—	0
2	1	0	1	2
3	0	1	0	1
4	1	1	1	1

Note: 1 = presence; 2 = absence.

the United States and Israel before it became a nation; both feature the same outcome as well as the same combination of scores on the causal variables. Row 3 represents the Netherlands, and row 4 represents Britain.

To capture the combination of conditions that led to the historic performance of the vanguard role, the first step is to undertake Boolean multiplication, which differs from arithmetical multiplication. Boolean multiplication is the combination of conditions associated with presence of the outcome. Its notation uses uppercase to indicate presence and lowercase to indicate absence. For this example:  $V = Ab$  (from row 2) and  $V = AB$  (from row 4). Note that  $ab$  and  $aB$  are not associated with the presence of  $V$ . Boolean multiplication is logical AND. The next step is Boolean addition, which is logical OR. In our example,  $V = Ab + AB$ . This expression tells us that the historic vanguard role of voluntary agencies occurs in countries where there is strong citizen participation and there is not a strong central government or in countries where there is strong citizen participation and a strong central government. Of course, we already know that. The relations are obvious in this relatively simple example. However, we can further reduce this result by applying Boolean minimization. As Ragin (1987, p. 93) puts it, "if two Boolean expressions differ in only one causal condition yet produce the same outcome, then the causal condition that distinguishes the two expressions can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a simpler, combined expression." In our example,  $V = Ab + AB$ . Since the expressions  $Ab$  and  $AB$  differ only in  $Bb$ ,  $Bb$  can be eliminated, resulting in  $V = A$ . This result tells us that strong citizen participation has been crucial to the presence of the vanguard role in periods of welfare state development in the four countries.

To further illustrate both the potential of Boolean techniques and some problems, I will use some of Gamson's (1975) data on the outcomes of U.S. social movement organizations. As noted earlier, Gamson (1975) used two measures to assess the effectiveness of fifty-three challenging groups: achieving acceptance by adversaries and gaining new advantages for constituent-

cies. He investigated the bivariate relation between the outcomes and several independent variables. I have selected four causal conditions for analysis: the occurrence of violence in interactions between the challenging group and others, the fact that the group pursued (or did not pursue) a public good, the presence of a dominant leader in the group, and the presence of a full bureaucracy—that is, of an organization with a written constitution, a formal membership list, and three or more levels of hierarchy. Gamson's (1975) analyses suggest that two of these conditions, violence and bureaucracy, are related to outcomes, and the other two are related to important issues in the various theories of nonprofit organizations. Table 2 presents the truth table for the empirically occurring cases related to the acceptance outcome. (Three logically possible combinations contained no cases.)

I have chosen not to analyze the combinations of causal conditions that do not exist empirically, although Ragin (1987) presents applications of the Boolean techniques to this problem. Table 2 includes "contradictory" rows (rows 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, and 11) in which not all the cases sharing the same combination of causal variable values share the same outcome values. I have chosen an "easy" response by coding the outcome as present if it is present in a majority of the existing cases. A better way of dealing with the problem would be to find an additional causal variable that, when included, eliminated the contradictions. Ragin (1987) offers other, more complex solutions.

Given the choices that I have made, application of the multiplication and addition procedures in instances when  $Y$  is present leads to  $Y = abcD + abCD + AbcD$ . Applying the minimization rule,  $abcD$  combines

**Table 2. Data on Acceptance of Challenging Groups**

Row	Violence A	Public Good B	Dominant Leader C	Full Bureaucracy D	Acceptance Y	Number of Cases	Cases with Presence of Y
1	0	0	0	0	0	9	0
2	0	0	0	1	1	10	6
3	0	0	1	0	0	8	3
4	0	0	1	1	1	4	3
5	0	1	0	0	0	3	1
6	0	1	0	1	0	1	0
7	0	1	1	0	0	3	1
8	1	0	0	0	0	3	0
9	1	0	0	1	1	5	4
10	1	0	1	0	0	2	1
11	1	0	1	1	0	2	1
12	1	1	0	1	0	2	0
13	1	1	1	0	0	1	0

Source: Data extracted from Gamson, 1975.

with  $abCD$  to produce  $abD$ , and  $abcd$  combines with  $AbcD$  to produce  $bcD$ . The result is the reduced expression  $Y = abd + bcD$ . This result suggests that a challenging group gains acceptance when it is fully bureaucratic, no violence has occurred, and it has not pursued public goods or when it is fully bureaucratic, lacks a dominant leader, and has not pursued public goods. In contrast to Gamson's (1975) bivariate finding that violence can lead to acceptance, this analysis, in line with DiMaggio's and Powell's (1983) institutional isomorphism argument, find that bureaucratization is fundamental. Violence by itself is not associated with acceptance (see row 8), and it always occurs with bureaucratization. (The one exception occurs in row 10.)

The same sort of Boolean analysis of the presence of new advantages leads to a more complicated result, namely  $X = abD + bcD + aBd + AbCd$ . New advantages occur under more varied combinations of conditions. These examples illustrate the power of Boolean algebra. The technique seems useful both for studies of voluntarism, philanthropy, and nonprofit organizations across nations and for comparative organizational case studies within a country.

## Conclusion

As noted earlier, methodological issues are inevitably bound up with theoretical and paradigmatic issues. This paper has reviewed two theory-and-method issues basic to the development of specific measures of the effectiveness of NGOs and NPOs. The first is the issue of defining NGOs and NPOs. The second is the issue of distinguishing them from other types of organizations. Two differing approaches to the former issue have developed in the United States: the voluntary organizations tradition and the non-profit organizations tradition. These two traditions have affected the second issue—distinguishing types of NGOs and NPOs. Drawing on the distinctions derived from the two traditions, this paper argues for two fundamental types of NGOs and NPOs: charitable service organizations and social movement and advocacy organizations. I reviewed workable conceptions of effectiveness for each type, and I suggested that multiple measures are necessary.

The paper also presented and illustrated the uses of Boolean algebra as an analytical technique. The technique appears to be applicable both to studies across nations and to comparative case studies of NGOs and NPOs.

The organizational effectiveness of NGOs and NPOs has been little studied. As this review suggests, there are daunting theoretical and methodological problems. Nonetheless, I remain convinced that effectiveness is an important construct that researchers should not ignore. I believe that this paper provides some clarification of the issues and some workable methods that can be used to advance such research.

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